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ABSTRACT
Since earth satellites afford an offensive military potential to any
of our nation's enemies it is essential that an effective countermeasure
he developed. This paper analyzes the problem of terminal guidance for
an anti-satellite missile and investigates some of the factors that would
determine the feasibility of such a weapon if a nuclear warhead cannot be
used.
Inherent errors of an anti-satellite weapon system necessitate ter-
minal guidance. The kinematic relationship between the target and a
weapon package which has been carried as the payload of an anti-satellite
missile are investigated at the time when terminal guidance would have to
be effected. Preliminary design criteria which could be derived from this
relationship are discussed. A typical weapon package is then proposed in
order to further investigate design parameters. Studies of some overall
system errors are also included.
This paper proves that terminal guidance for an anti-satellite missile
is both necessary and feasible.
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The object of this study is to present a solution to the problem of
terminal guidance for an anti-satellite missile and to investigate some




Earth satellites are capable of performing a variety of missions which
are of military value. Examples of such missions are:
1. Location and surveillance of strategic airfields, and
marshalling yards.
2. Battle damage reconnaissance after the initial phases
of a nuclear attack.
3. Service as a communication link,
J*. Service as a navigation aid.
5. Possible bases for weapons carriers.
These and other satellite missions must he denied an enemy, in effective
countermeasure to an earth satellite is therefore a necessity.
This paper assumes the existence of an anti-satellite weapon system.
Its major components and their capabilities are described in a series of
preliminary assumptions. The basis of the weapon system is an air-launched
missile carrying a weapon package as a payload. Fig. 1-1 depicts the over-
all concept of the weapon system. The missile will be launched up a com-
puter-determined local radial, At an altitude and velocity dependent on
target altitude, the weapon package will be separated from the missile.
This separation will occur such that the velocity imparted to the weapon

package will cause the peak of the trajectory to be at the predicted
intersection of the radial and the satellite course. Furthermore, this
peak will occur at the precise time that the satellite is at that predicted
point in space.
Errors inherent in such a system can immediately he pointed out. It
can also be immediately pointed out that a nuclear warhead would have a
kill radius which is capable of offsetting these errors. However, due to
either an international agreement or considerations of space contamination,
it may be impossible to use a nuclear warhead. If faced with such a nu-
clear ban, and when confronted with the errors inherent in hitting a
point in space, it becomes obvious that intercept probabilities remain
extremely low unless some method of terminal guidance is an integral part
of the weapon system.
Terminal guidance, as conceived by this paper, is to be effected by
the weapon package. The weapon package includes a target seeker and a
thrust unit capable of thrusting in any or all of four mutually orthogonal
directions. The technique for utilization of this thrust is explained
in detail in the body of the paper.
Note on Fig. 1-1 that the weapon package trajectory is hooked at its
peak. The weapon package will of necessity remain in the satellite's
cylinder of probable courses for a longer period of time (as compared to
firing past the course while ascending and giving no thought to the descent)
if this hookshot is used. If the exact intercept fails, probability of
detection and the use of terminal guidance is enhanced since the seeker




while at the hook of the trajectory.
Derivation Summaries in Chapter 2 fully develop the geometrical re-
lationships between satellite and weapon package during the terminal guid-
ance phase of intercept. Chapter 3 points out some useful design para-
meters that result from a study of the equations of the Derivation Summaries
Limited feasibility studies are carried out in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
In these chapters thrust requirements are analyzed in some detail. From
the standpoint of thrust requirements, it is concluded that terminal
guidance is possible if other system errors are reasonably controlled.
The effect of increasing seeker capability over that of the basic assump-
tions is also studied, Finally, an analysis of some considerations which




SOLUTION OF THE GUIDANCE FROBLEM
A, Basic Assumptions
The introduction to this study of terminal guidance implied that an
anti-satellite missile had been launched from an attack aircraft in such
a manner that it would intercept and destroy an earth satellite. It is
"beyond the scope of this paper to investigate all of the concepts which
would contribute to the success of a weapon system with such a capability.
Brief mention of only a few of the factors which would contribute to a
complex system of this type will illustrate this statement, Such factors
are the determination of the satellite's exact position in space at any
predicted time, the ability of the attacking aircraft to be at an exact
launching point precisely at a specified time, the reliability demanded
of the missile's primary propulsive installation, and the establishment
of a reference system to enable the missile to determine its orientation
in space,
Fig, 1-1 is a pictorial presentation of the ideal intercept using an
air-launched system. To achieve the intercept as shown each phase of the
system must function as planned, Prior to detailing the kinematics in-
volved in the terminal guidance to be proposed by this paper, it would be
useful to fully state the assumptions under which this terminal guidance

is to be applied. The role played by terminal guidance can then be more
fully understood and appreciated.
It is to be assumed that the satellite's orbit can be determined with
reasonable accuracy, At any time the satellite can be forecast to be with-
in a cylinder in space whose diameter is 4 miles and whose length is 10
miles. Ideally, it would be at the center of this cylinder.
The existence of a missile capable of being fired from an aircraft
to altitudes of 100 to 1000 miles is also assumed. If for no other reason
than economic considerations, one missile should have a capability for any
range within this spectrum. It necessarily follows from the missile assump-
tion that there also be in existence an aircraft capable of launching the
missile; one of the specifications of such an aircraft might be that it be
able to attain speeds which complement initial missile velocities, and
hence range, rather than increase missile size to achieve the same veloc-
ities,
Belated to these aircraft factors is the assumption that there are in
existence tracking and computing systems which monitor both the satellite
and the launch aircraft and which furnish the necessary information to
position the aircraft for missile launch, Included in this loop is a
presentation enabling the pilot to maneuver the aircraft as necessary.
The departure point for implementation of terminal guidance is tar-
get acquisition by a detection system in the missile. An infra-red seeker
with a 100 mile detection capability is assumed to be aboard the missile.
This unit will yield information pertaining to the angular velocity of
the line-of-sight between the missile and the target. However, intelligent

use of this information assumes that a reference system is being main-
tained, and the existence and stability of this reference system is a
further assumption of the basic situation. Moreover, this same or a
similar reference system will also be necessary to insure that the mis-
sile follows a precomputed local radial to the impact point in space.
Briefly summarizing, and with reference to Pig, 1-1, it will be
assumed that the missile has been launched from the attack aircraft,
has been programmed onto the local radial, and by accurate velocity cut-
off techniques, has reached the peak of its trajectory at the precise
time that the satellite reaches this same location in space.
The astute reader immediately can point out factors which make the
probability of such an intercept almost zero. To mention a few will
suffice:
1. The accuracy of determination of the satellite trajec-
tory is the aforementioned space cylinder, Which of
the points in this volume shall be the aiming point?
2. Any deviation from the exact launch point will cause
a comparable miss at the peak of the missile's trajec-
tory if the remainder of the system performs perfectly.
3. Are rocket thrusts so invariant that the missile will
peak with no position error?
It may possibly be pointed out that the kill radius of a nuclear warhead
will suffice to account for all inherent errors. With this thought in
mind, one last assumption will be made. It will be assumed that the
nuclear capability cannot be exploited due to either international agree-
ment or military considerations of space contamination.
8

In view of the military advantages that satellites will afford, their
destruction is necessary and will therefore become a task for conventional
weapons. The inescapable errors mentioned above, and innumerable others,
serve only to point out that terminal guidance aboard the missile will not
be a luxury to merely refine the kill probability, Terminal guidance for




The geometrical relationship between the satellite and the missile in
the seconds Just prior to the closest passage between the two bodies can
be expressed in equation form. An earth-centered inert ial coordinate frame
can be used as a reference for physical quantities described by these equa-
tions. The angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the two bodies
as seen by instrumentation aboard the missile can also be expressed with
reference to this coordinate frame Suitable combinations of the equations,
coupled with a series of reasonable initial conditions, yield information
pertinent to the feasibility of terminal guidance. The necessary equations
are developed in Derivation Summaries on the pages that follow, and are
summarized in Table 2-1.
Derivation Summary 2-1, in conjunction with Fig. 2-1, develops an
expression for the angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the missile
and the satellite. Fig. 2=1 is not to scale, but since the reference frame
can be placed at any position the accuracy of the derivation is in no way
destroyed due to this liberty taken with the figure. The result of Der-
ivation Summary 2-1 will be recognized as one of the conventional fire
control equations. It is derived in this space-intercept concept to stress

Derivation Summary 2-1
Angular Velocity of the Line-of-Sight
Reference Pig. 2-1
Angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the target and the



























TKM) co' » (3)
the validity of its application.
Equation (3) of Derivation Summary 2-1 is then an expression for the
angular velocity of the line-of-6ight between the missile and the satellite,
referred to an inertial-space coordinate system. The reference axis par-
allel to the missile position vector BIM and one of the reference axes
normal to the missile position vector will form a plane parallel to the
10
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Fig. 2-1 Relationship of the angular velocity of the present




satellite's orbital plane. The direction of the third reference vector
will be such as to form a right-handed orthogonal reference frame. The
eame reference frame carried in the missile can be the basis for initial
programming to the local radial and subsequent maneuvering during terminal
guidance. The reference frame depicted in Fig. 2-1 is the reference frame
which will be used as a basis for terminal guidance concepts of this paper.
In order to develop a solution for the terminal guidance problem in
this paper, a uniform gravity field is assumed to be acting on both the
missile and the satellite which is the target. Also the satellite as
the target is treated as a point mass in space which is in a circular
orbit about the earth. The velocity vector of the satellite is considered
tangent to the circular orbit at any point and of a constant magnitude
dependent on the height of the circular orbit above the earth. Therefore






where g g^ ( - o \
and g - 32.17 ft/sec2
R - 3959 statute miles
h = height above earth's surface
The direction of the target's velocity vector is assumed to be in
the plane of the satellite's orbit and normal to the radial position
vector of the target from the center of the earth at any instant of time.
When the missile's position vector is assumed to be in the plane of the
satellite's orbit a two-dimensional intercept problem is defined.
12

For the two-dimensional solution of the terminal guidance problem the
initial conditions of the terminal phase of the intercept can be presented
geometrically as shown in Fig, 2-2. Initial conditions are defined as the
geometric and physical conditions at the instant of time when the missile
seeker first detects the target. If at this instant the seeker also detects
an angular velocity of the line-of-sight to the target, missile thrust is
cut on - simultaneously with detection.
For time subsequent to the initial conditions, the geometric con-
siderations of the intercept are shown in Fig. 2-3, where the missile
thrust, if required, is directed along the local radial. With a uniform
gravity field acting the target will follow the circular path; the missile
(with some initial velocity, an added thrust program and gravity, all
acting along the local radial) will proceed along the local radial to
intercept the target at point G. If for the time subsequent to the
initial conditions gravity is considered to influence both target and
missile equally and hence considered to be absent, the target must follow
a path tangent to its gravity-influenced orbit at its initial location.
The missile will follow the local radial under the influeace of its initial
velocity and an added thrust program to intercept the target at point I.
Interception, of course, is only possible in both situations if the
missile thrust program is properly devised. Consider that on initial
seeker pickup an angular velocity of the line-of-sight will cause a simul-
taneous application of missile thrust of a constant magnitude directed
along the local radial. This thrust is to act until the seeker detects
zero angular velocity of the line-of-sight, at which time thrust is si-






Fig. 2-2 Geometric Features of Initial Conditions
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cutoff the missile and target both have constant velocities with the
angular velocity of the line-of-sight zero, a constant hearing intercept
must follow. For the gravity situation and the same thrust program there
will develop a very small angular velocity of the line-of-sight after thrust
cutoff. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 6. It is shown there that
if thrust is applied at initial detection of an angular velocity of the
line-of-sight and thrust cutoff simultaneously with zero angular velocity
of the line-of-sight the miss distance is of very small magnitude. This
miss distance approaches zero as the thrusting time approaches the total
terminal intercept time.
The intercept equations are based on the gravity-free geometric con-
siderations of Fig. 2-3 and developed in the Derivation Summaries. The
three-dimensional aspects of the problem will be treated in a later section,
as will some feasibility conclusions based on the presently discussed two-
dimensional intercept equations.
Derivation Summary 2-2 presents the geometrical features and the
geometrical relationships of the terminal phase of the interception. Der-
ivation Summary 2-3 is a development of the missile equations for a gravity-
free environment. Equations for the missile position, velocity, and accel-
eration during thrust as well as missile position and velocity after thrust
cutoff are developed. These equations are later used to develop angular
velocity of the line-of-sight and present range.
Derivation Summary 2-4 develops the equation for the angular velocity
of the line-of~sight. The reference frame used in the development is an





Tig. 2-3 Geometric Feature! of the Intercept
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velocity of the present line-of-sight from Derivation Summary 2-1 is
applicable.
Derivation Summary 2-5 develops the equation for the present range
based on the rate of change of present range. The rate of change of present
range is the vector sum of the components of target motion and missile





The initial conditions for the terminal guidance phase of the inter-
ception determine two sides and the Included angle of the fire control
triangle. The third side is the line-of-sight between the missile and
target and a function of target and missile motion (see Tig. 2-4).
The geometrical aspects of this triangle can he expressed in terms
of the initial condition constants and the time dependent variables.
a. Initial Conditions
The Initial range, a ; the initial angle the line-of-sight makes
o
with the reference frame, (3 ; and the height of the target's circular
orbit from the center of the earth, r-, completely specify the initial
conditions. All other geometrical initial value constants can be ex-
pressed in terms of these three.
^4=^r»-w-^«-£-|^
(2)
^^ ° A, A, a4iuq y^cuHLe. - yij (3)
Prom (3) it can be shown that,
from (2) and (3)
(Page 1 of 2)
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from (1) and (3)
b. Time Dependent Variables
At some general time, t, after initial seeker pickup the following
geometrical relationships are established by reference to Pig. 2-4.
From triangle MIT,
6b = *£-£*
&MsA = (da -^) ^O^c ( 7 )




-fi)* 0i*o4jeat/4- GHtttiAvLfl (9)
If a line is constructed from point T perpendicular to the line MI then
MI will be divided into two parts as shown in Pig. 2-5. Prom the right
triangle MPT formed by this construction, ^ can be expressed as a function
of the initial value constants, the present range, and time.
so^S = M,-^)->fr4 -*;&*,< {10)
where £/, = ^k
time required for the target to travel from initial pickup to the impact
point.
(Page 2 of 2)
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^S/rf j6 = ^r- -^
COS fi = g4 ~ Vr* ce/tder o^ &7/>M












Fig. 2-5 Expression for sin 3 as a






Assume that the acceleration of the missile in the reference frame
is at every instant equal to the thrust force divided by the mass of the
missile, gravity being neglected; that is for a point mass;
m m
(1)
where ? is thrust force per unit mas 8.
Integration of the above equation yields the missile velocity at
any time during which thrust is acting.
V = P»t V
m n^
Integration of this equation yields the missile position at any time
during which thrust is acting,






b. After Thrust Cutoff
Assume that the acceleration of the missile in the reference frame




m f m w
r r V (t - tf ) (5)
(Fage 1 of 2)
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where tf = the time at which thruet is cut off
t = any time after initial seeker pickup of the target and thrust
cuton, which are considered to occur simultaneously
r = missile location at the time of thrust cutoff
mf
V missile velocity at the time of thrust cutoff (note that V
,
mf> nif
a constant, will define the missile velocity at any time, t,
greater than t-»,




Angular Velocity of the Line-of-Sight
From Derivation Summary 2-1, the angular velocity of the line-of-
sight of the target from the missile may be expressed as:
W =r ^r <4"U& _ >jg ^ry('90-/3)
cl L r ' m ' J
From equation (7) and equation (8) of Derivation Summary 2-2,
46 &L r cu m CL J
where r and 7 are to he expressed as functions of initial conditions
m m
and time, depending on the thrust condition of the missile as shown in
Derivation Summary 2-3.
a. Before Thrust Cutoff
0?
where Aon* ¥[ , r and d can he expressed in terms of the initial valueso o o
a
, 3 , and r_ given hy equations (4), (5), and (6) of Derivation Summary
2-2.
r = initial missile position from center of the earth
m
o
along the missile path
V = initial missile velocity at seeker pickup
o
(Page 1 of 2)
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l>. After Thrust Cutoff
at
if
where t _ = time during which missile thrust acts,
w
*2rf vr (A°-Am°) -*(*++* to +f'* <f





The rate of change of present range is the vector sum of the com-
ponents of target motion and missile motion resolved along the line-of-
sight. From Fig. 2-k the rate of change of range can he expressed as:
d&= — f'
S
r C&bG + }/m c<^h (90-fl) 7
from equation (9) of Derivation Summary 2-2






where r and V are to he expressed as functions of initial conditionsmm *
and time, depending on the thrust condition of the missile as shown in
Derivation Summary 2-3.
a. Before Thrust Cutoff
t 2
With r - Ji i- + V t * r
m 2 m m
m m
and V = P't + V
""o




substituted into the equation above and both sides of the equation in-
tegrated, the result expresses the present range at any time t < t_
,
where t is the time of missile thrust cutoff.
b. After Thrust Cutoff
• *2r»t
With r * - * * T t- + r (P't. * V ) (t - O
m 2 m^ i mA 1 nu 1
and V
m
= F»tf t J
substituted into the basic equation and both sides of the equation in-
tegrated, the result expresses the present range at any time t > t..




Summary of Intercept Equations for a




* *'* + ^o
*m
*%&/t\- w4%y ^-pt+xwne)]
n* -.[ e£ti{*i/r- e**WK,ti- F't)] + (ac -*„,)
(f't*+ Zfy -*z*&*.4l)-t*{>(.-i(.*nK
<V*t + "'6) + l* <*'+$ *,) ~ C&fj]
After Thrust Cutoff
«»
Am t- the time at which
thrust is cut offM
K, f=% * ^.
^m -V,? -A «4y (V"^)
Ks ^//rft-^.)-4^^^) * #V,//
a?
i4 -£&*.#,) * ?'%(*£+2b-2* -£*-&*)
+ p'*fyC$+*4ft-*i*) +*'**! (<*"*>%
- d/ca^i\ - 4*^ ^"^ # J) 7
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C. Terminal Guidance Technique
As was indicated in the introduction and basic assumptions, terminal
guidance must be used to make an anti-satellite weapons system effective.
The anti-satellite missile will carry terminal guidance in the form of an
infra-red target seeker and a thrust unit. As the missile approaches the
peak of its trajectory the seeker will be turned on. Detection of the
target by the seeker will undoubtedly be immediately followed by the sensing
of an angular Telocity of the line-of-sight between target and missile.
This angular velocity signal will in turn actuate the thrust unit. Action
between missile and target is as described by the equations of the pro-
ceeding section.
In order to produce a collision between the weapons package and the
satellite, thrust must be applied to the weapon package in such a direct-
ion as to produce a velocity vector which will cause the angular velocity
of the line-of-sight between the weapon package and the satellite to become
nulled. Assume that the satellite or target - represented as a point mass
In space with a given velocity vector - and the weapon package are being
aeted upon by a uniform gravity field. When the angular velocity of the
line-of-sight has been nulled, thrust is cut off, target and missile are
under the influence of the same gravity field, and a constant bearing
intercept of the target by the weapon package will occur.
An intercept of a target will result, using a minimum of fuel, by
applying a constant thrust in a fixed direction. For this study of ter-
minal guidance, the minimum level of thrust required to effect an inter-
cept is a fixed quantity determined by the initial acquisition slant range
and the initial angular velocity of the line-of-sight.
29

The thrust direction for a minimum fuel intercept has been determined
by Ref. 2 to be 90° from the initial line-of-sight. In vector form the
expression for the direction of the applied thrust may be expressed as below;
5/T - l rw _, XIVols] " 'M,
For the two-dimenionsal derivations developed in Derivation Summaries
2-3, 2-4, and 2-5, the direction of the applied thrust is 1* . In order
r
m
for the thrust direction to be that for a minimum fuel intercept, the
thrust direction should be 1 w * < LS >nW
I(LS) °
o
, Because the angle 0, of
the two-dimensional case, which is developed by the initial angular vel-
ocity of the line-of-sight, is a small angle, 1- differs very little







derivations in this study differs very slightly from the optimum thrust
direction for a minimum fuel intercept provided initial target acquisition
is made at the extreme range of the weapon package seeker device capability.
In this study for terminal guidance it is envisaged that actual thrust
direction for the weapon package will be generated by four thrust nozzles
which are placed in perfect quadrature about the weapon package. Two of the
nozzles will produce a thrust direction along the position vector for the
weapon package. The other pair of nozzles will produce a thrust direction
normal to the weapon package position vector, in a plane normal to the
orbital plane of the satellite. For a situation which would require a
thrust direction other than along or normal to the weapon package position
vector, combinations of the four nozzles will be used to produce the re-
quired thrust direction,
The following chapters will consider some of the aspects of these




PBELIMINABY STUDY OP FEASIBILITY
The two-dimensional equations of the terminal phase of the inter-
ception can he used to some advantage in a preliminary study of the
feasibility of such a system. With any given set of initial conditions
the equations will establish the minimum thrust required to reduce the
angular Telocity of the line-of-sight to zero within the total inter-
cept time available (i.e., the time required for the target to move from
its initial pickup point in orbit to the point where the local radial
intersects the orbit). Under the assumptions of the derivation of the
equations the missile is treated as a peint mass with a constant accel-
eration during the thrust phase of the intercept,
With a given set of initial conditions, Pig. 3-1, Pig. 3-2, and
Pig. 3-3 show the angular velocity of the line-of-sight as a function of
time for various thrust levels. The initial conditions are based on a
target predicted to be in a 100 mile orbit above the surface of the earth.
The missile programmed flight is along the local radial to hook at the 100
mile orbit altitude at exactly the time the target passes the local radial.
If the initial conditions were such that the target had no deviation from
either its predicted path or its time passage of the local radial and the
missile had no deviation from its programmed flight then a seeker pickup
31

at 100 miles range would detect no angular velocity of the line-of-sight
,
No terminal thrust would he initiated and the intercept would be completed
without need for terminal guidance. If however, the initial conditions
were such that a combination of the deviation of the target from its pre-
dicted path and time and the deviation of the missile from its programmed
flight resulted in some error, terminal guidance would be required. This
total deviation can be expressed in terms of displacement deviation alone
if timing error is considered xero. Hence a 2 mile displacement error earn
be considered as pure displacement error with no time error or as a fic-
titious displacement error made up of displacement and time errors.
For the condition when target path is 2 miles above predicted and
the missile has no deviation from programmed flight, seeker pickup at
100 miles range detects W_ = 0.965 mr/see, and terminal thrust is
initiated until W = 0. The result of these initial conditions is
plotted in Fig, 3-1 for thrust levels of 100, 200, and 300 ft/see (lbs.
of thrust /lbs. of mass). In a similar manner Fig. 3-2 and Fig. 3-3 are
plotted for initial conditions with 4 and 6 mile total deviation from
predicted and programmed conditions.
The feasibility of a system using this type of terminal guidance is
defined in the assumptions and results of the time to null the angular
velocity of the line-of-sight. The minimum required thrust in all initial
conditions considered is 200 lbs. thrust per lb. of mass. The minimum
required thrust for initial conditions up to b miles of deviation from
predicted is 100 lbs. thrust per lb. of mass. For initial conditions of
2 miles deviation from predicted somewhat less than 100 lbs. thrust per
lb. of mass is required.
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Chapter k continues with some feasibility studies of a hypothetical













An interesting and productive feasibility study can be made of the
thrust required to effect an intercept if a missile is fired within the
framework of the assumptions of Chapter 2, Section A. This chapter will
show that insofar as thrust requirements are concerned, terminal guidance
is feasible if other system assumptions can be met.
As was done with the intercept equations, the essentials of the thrust
problem will be developed on a two-dimensional basis. The three-dimensional
intercept will be effected as was explained in Section C of Chapter 2, i.e.
,
by the use of two pairs of mutually orthogonal thrust nozzles exhausting
from a single thrust chamber. The following section of this chapter will
again touch briefly upon this design.
B. Typical Weapon Package
In order to arrive at numerical values of thrust required for the
weapon package it is necessary to think in terms of a definite weapon.
Purely for illustrative purposes a basic weapon of the following con-





Bated Sea Level Thrust , 2710 lbs,
Sea Level Exhaust Velocity, 8700 ft/sec
Fropellant Consumption, 10 lb/sec
k = 1.27







Brief justification of these values can he made. The Snarler air-
craft rocket engine developed in England had a dry weight of approximately
275 1D8 « ancL a thrust of 2630 lbs. Engineering advances since its develop-
ment should permit the increased thrust rating; the additional weight should
he adequate to account for the four nozzle configurations mentioned when
discussing the three-dimensional intercepts. The engineering details of
such a power plant will not he considered since it is felt that such a
discussion is not fully in keeping with the objective of the paper. If
it is felt that such a power plant is not a practical scheme, four pre-
packaged liquid rocket motors can he used in its place. The latter pro-
pulsion scheme for the weapons package would increase its overall weight
hut would he an engineering fact at this time. The method to he used to
arrive at feasihility conclusions can he applied to either power plant by
merely substituting the correct numbers. Since the single thrust chamber
power plant results in a decided savings in weight, thrust studies will be
made assuming that it is the power plant aboard the missile package.
Fuel consumption of the Snarler engine was 10 lbs. of propellent per
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second. The flight time to intercept, after detection, was used in con-
Junction with this fact as a basis for propel Iant weight. Seeker weight
represents an estimate for a complete infra-red seeker unit, including
power supply , capable of 100 mile detection ranges. The warhead is a
government-furnished high explosive of a design and size suitable for
its intended mission.
C. Shots Short of Satellite Trajectory
Equation 2 of Derivation Summary 2-3 can be solved for P' to give
the thrust required, per pound of mass, to null the angular velocity of
the line-of-sight between target and missile at any time. If thrust is
found by this method for various sets of Initial conditions it should be
noted that the results will be based on a constant acceleration.
The actual problem however, with a constant thrust motor during the
brief terminal guidance phase, would result in increasing accelerations
as fuel is burned and the weight of the missile package decreases. This
in turn means that higher errors could be rectified by the terminal guid-
ance system for the same thrust rating than is indicated by Equation 2 of
Derivation Summary 2-3. In view of this consideration the following
equation, developed in Chapter 12 of Bef . 1 of the Bibliography can be
used to find relevant miss distance and thrust Information:




where A h is equivalent to the quantity r - r of Tig, 2-3
m mo
V is missile velocity at time of target detection
o
I is specific impulse, a variable with altitude
S is propellant loading factor
(The component of A h due to gravity has been omitted in this application
of the equation. This is in keeping with the principles discussed in Chapter 2.)
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With reference to Fig. ^-1, assume that the target is detected at T
when the missile is at M . If the shot in progress at this time is a per-
fect shot, intercept will he made at point K, the missile reaching the
peak of its trajectory at the same time the satellite passes through this
peak point. In such a case no terminal guidance is required. However
,
if the satellite is instead on course A, Tig. **-l, one mile ahove the
predicted trajectory, it will pass one mile above point K when the missile
peaks if nothing is done to correct this error. In accordance with the
technique described in Section C of Chapter 2, when missile position, M
,
°A
and target position, T
„
are such that the slant range is 100 miles,
°A
detection will occur and some value of thrust will he actuated to effect
the intercept. By assuming a series of initial conditions for various
probable errors all of the terms of the above equation except I can be
fixed. The equation can be solved for I , and since the propellant flow
rate has been fictitiously established, necessary thrust can be found.
If this thrust is less than the available rated thrust of the engine for
the particular altitude an intercept is possible. This difference in
thrust values means that the angular velocity of the line-of-sight would
be nulled more quickly and thrust would then be cut off in accordance
with principles already outlined. The limiting error for which an inter-
cept is possible is established when the thrust determined exactly equals
the thrust available. It should be noted that thrust from the engine
which is rated at 2710 pounds at sea level increases as altitude increases.
Jig. *t~2 is the result of taking various initial conditions at 100,
500, and 1000 mile altitudes in which a miss would occur due to the missile's
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Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
Falling Short of Perfect Trajectory, Satellite at 100 Miles
(tJnguided Miss Initial Conditions Thrust Required
at InterceptDistance Fickup Bangs V
ft /sec
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 634.3 20.75
1.0 100 634.0 20,742 723
2.0 100 633.7 20.734 1450
3.0 100 633.4 20.726 2158
4.0 100 633.1 20.718 2852
5.0 100 632,8 20.710 3568
5.29 100 632.7 20.708 3800
Taole 4-2
Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
Falling Short of Perfect Trajectory, Satellite at 500 Miles
Jnguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Required
at InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft/sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 550,1 21.83
1.0 100 5^9.7 21.815 745
2.0 100 5^9,3 21.80 1484
3*0 100 548.9 21.785 2244
4.0 100 548.5 21,77 2990
5.0 100 548.1 21.755 3740




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
Falling Short of Ferfect Trajectory, Satellite at 1000 Miles
Unguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Required
for InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(Miles) (Miles) ft /sec (seconds) (pounds)
100 470.2 23.05
1.0 100 470.0 23.04 767
2.0 100 469.8 23.03 1532
3.0 100 469.6 23.02 2301
4.o 100 469.4 23.01 3070
5.0 100 469.2 23.00 3845
6.0 100 469.0 22.99 4620
6.01 100 469.0 22,99 4630
missile shot was on schedule for a perfect intercept hut the satellite
was either one or two miles above its predicted track, this error going
to the maximum allowable satellite error of the basic assumptions. The
total intercept error was then extended to the maximum allowable error,
based on the thrust available, assuming that these additional errors were
due to the missile's falling short of the perfect intercept point.
This chapter studies only those errors which are due to physical
departures from the perfect satellite or missile courses. It is also
possible to have errors in time in which either or both the satellite or
missile are on perfect tracks but are following time schedules which
would not result in an intercept. However cases such as these, in which
for instance the satellite will reach the impact point earlier than pre-
dicted, are less critical than errors due to trajectory or orbital position










governed by the more dominant or more critical errors this chapter analyzes
only those errors due to trajectory or orbital displacement inaccuracies.
Pertinent data and results are tabulated in Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3. Both
Fig. 4-2 and the tables are carried only to the value of thrust available
at the altitude being analyzed.
Pig. 4-2 immediately shows that for the spectrum of targets from 100
to 1000 miles in altitude errors at low altitude are more detrimental to
overall success. A shot which would result in a $.5 mile short if no
terminal guidance were used could not be salvaged if the target were at
100 miles altitude and the assumed propulsion system aboard. The same
propulsion system would be capable of effecting terminal guidance against
a 500 or 1000 mile altitude target with a $.5 mile miss distance.
The fact that less error is correctable at lower altitudes is offset
however by two factors;
1. Satellite tracking is more accurate at the lower altitudes,
therefore errors due to the determination of the satellite's
track should be smaller.
2. Errors due to missile misalignment , thrust variation, etc.,
do not have the opportunity to be compounded to the same
extent in a 100 mile shot as they would in a 1000 mile shot.
Both of these factors will result in a smaller total error at lower al-
titudes. Therefore, while the system has a lesser capability at lower
altitudes, the error situations at lower altitudes should be less severe.
In order to obtain Pig. 4-2, errors were assigned to missile to fully
exploit the capability of the assumed power plant. If the cumulative
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effect of missile errors can also be given an upper bound as was done with
satellite track determination, Fig, 4-2 may be used to find thrust required
of a power plant. For instance, if the missile could definitely be placed
within one half mile of a desired point in space, an error no greater than
two and one half miles could be assigned to the entire shot. From Pig, 4-2,
a thrust of 1800 pounds would effect a kill against a 100 mile target. The
design problem could then be worked in reverse to find sea level thrust,
exhaust velocity, and other power plant parameters.
D. Shots Over Satellite Trajectory
Situations could also be presented to the weapon package in which it
would peak over the precomputed satellite track. Such a situation would
develop if the satellite track were actually below the perfect or pre-
computed track, or if missile performance caused the package to peak at
a higher altitude than predicted. Course B of Fig. 4-1 depicts such a
situation with a one mile overshoot. In this case the weapon package is
at M and the satellite at T when detection occurs. The same tech-
°b °B
niques used in the previous section can then be used to find thrust re-
quirements to effect terminal guidance. Tables 4-4, 4-5, and 4-6, and
Fig. 4-3 present the results of assuming the same series of unguided miss
distances for shots over the perfect satellite track that were used for
shot 8 short of the perfect satellite track.
A comparison of the data of Tables 4-1 to 4-6 yields the maximum
error capability of the assumed weapon package. As can be seen from the
data, at all altitudes shots that fall short of the trajectory have lower
salvageable errors than shots that go over the trajectory. Since there is




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements Por Shots
Going Over Perfect Trajectory, Satellite at 100 Miles
Qnguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Required
at InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft/sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 634.3 20.75
1 100 63^.6 20.758 556
2 100 634.9 20.766 1112
3 100 635.2 20.774 1669
k 100 635.5 20.782 2223
5 100 635.8 20.790 2772
6 100 636.I 20.798 3333
6,82 100 636.4 20.805 3800
Table 4=5
Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots




at InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft /sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 550.1 21.83
1 100 550.5 21.845 640
2 100 550.9 21.86 1279
3 100 551.2 21.875 1917
4 100 551.6 21.89 2553
5 100 552.0 21.905 3189
6 100 552.4 21.920 3834




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
doing Over Perfect Trajectory, Satellite at 1000 Miles
Unguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Required
at InterceptPickup Bangs V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft /sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 470.2 23.05
1 100 470.4 23.06 744




4 100 471.0 23.09 2989
5 100 471.2 23.10 3728
6 100 471.4 23.ll 4488
6.19 100 471,4 23.112 4630
launched, the shots short of the trajectory determine the limit of the ter-
minal guidance capability for the assumed weapon package. For instance,
if it were known that the total error against a 100 mile target could "be
as high as 6 miles, the assumed weapon package would not he capable of
correcting this error if it occurred due to a short shot. To use the
assumed weapon package errors against 100 mile targets cannot exceed 5*29
miles. Similar limits of 5.59 miles and 6.01 miles can he sst for the 500
and 1000 mile altitude targets respectively.
A comparison of the thrust requirements reveals that less thrust is
needed to effect terminal guidance if the shot is over the perfect satellite
track. This is because gravity augments the power plant thrust in effecting
closure to the target. This latter statement is true in spite of the fact
that the missils's upward velocity must first be stopped and then the





X. Time Lead Technique
missile shot which peaked the weapon package so that It is exactly
on the satellite course at detection time would require only a holding
thrust to counter gravity. A guidance thrust of 692,0 pounds would hold
the simulated weapon package at a satellite altitude of 100 miles until
the satellite arrived, This technique of leading the satellite in time
Instead of attempting to make the exact intercept of the basic assumptions
would result in lower thrust requirements for the weapon package. It can
he shown, for example, that at the same 100 mile target altitude with an
overshoot of one mile, 135 pounds of thrust is sufficient to effect ter-
minal guidance. In this case the weapon package was at the peak of its
trajectory with zero velocity when target detection occurred. This thrust,
plus the gravity effect, will then effect terminal guidance.
Tables 4-7 and 4-8 present thrust requirements for an overall system
based on such a time lead technique. The same increments of error from
the aiming point as were used previously were used for these tables. The
aiming point for these cases however is a lead point such that the weapon
package peaks on the satellite track with zero velocity when the satellite
is at the detection range of the seeker.
As would be expected due to the influence of gravity, overshoots
with this technique are more salvageable than undershoots. Since the
lower miss distance determines the system capability however, the system
has a maximum error capability of 5*57 miles at this altitude.
While it is evident that thrust requirements are lower it should be




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
Short of Perfect Trajectory, Time Lead Technique, Satellite at 100 Miles
Unguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Required
at InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft /sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 20.75 692.0
1 100 20.742 1248,0
2 100 20.734 I805.0
3 100 20.726 2360.0
4 100 20.718 2920.0
5 100 20.710 3480.0
5.57 100 20.705 38OO.O
Table 4-8
Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots





at InterceptPickup Range V
mo
Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft/sec (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
100 20.75 692.0
1 100 20.7^2 135.0
2 100 20. 734 420.0
3 100 20.726 975.0
4 100 20.718 1532.0
5 100 20.710 2082.0
6 100 20.702 2638.0
7 100 20.694 3182.0
8 100 20.686 3740.0
8.1 100 20.685 3800.0
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by only 0.28 miles. It should also "be kept in mind that disadvantages
can he inherent in the time lead technique. One such disadvantage is the
fact that predicting the necessary time lead can introduce further errors
into an overall system which already has many error possibilities. If
satellite prediction and missile performance prove to give errors of only
two to three miles, the thrust requirements for the system originally
assumed are not unreasonable. Use of the original system to avoid time
lead errors would therefore be justified.
?. Conclusions
The thrust levels discussed in this chapter are attainable as is
evidenced by achievements in the aircraft rocket engine field. Firing
errors to he corrected are felt to he above those predicted by authorative
sources. In view of these considerations and the results of previous
sections of this chapter, terminal guidance for an anti-satellite missile
is feasible insofar as thrust requirements are concerned.
The numerical results of the chapter apply only to the simulated
weapon package. However the method of arriving at these results is valid
for any weapon package and unless a unit were used which departed radisally





EFFECT OF SEEKER PERFORMANCE
A. Furpose of Analysis
The chapter immediately preceding developed the thrust requirement
and allowable error* for a simulated missile package. Changes in the
capability of this weapon package will probably occur if the performance
of its components were changed. This chapter will show the major effects
of an increase in the seeker's detection capability.
This change in seeker range will primarily change the amount of thrust
required to achieve satisfactory terminal guidance for various error con-
ditions. It is recognized that a compounding of effects occurs, For la-
st anee, if as a result of increasing seeker range, reduced thrust levels
may be used to achieve terminal guidance, the lower thrust would permit a
weight savings on the motor. A further slight reduction in thrust is then
possible because of the decreased weight. However, the effect of increasing
seeker capability will not be pursued to this extent. Only the major effect
of a change in seeker performance will be analyzed.
B. Considerations and Results of Analysis
The analysis was made using the simulated missile package of Chapter 4.
Seeker detection capability was changed however from 100 to 125 miles. On*
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immediate effect of this increase in detection range is that longer flight
times after detection are involved. An investigation of the three altitudes
previously analyzed shows that the longest flight time occurs with a 1000
lie target altitude. Missile thrust for a maximum period of 28.8 seconds
may he necessary in this case. Since the same missile package will be
used over the entire altitude spectrum from 100 to 1000 miles, fuel must
"be provided for this flight time. Accordingly, in the simulated package,
fuel is increased to 290 pounds; it follows that cP becomes 0.317.
The same techniques used to find thrust requirements in Chapter k
can then be used. Shots short of a 100 mile satellite trajectory were
arbitrarily chosen as a basis for comparing the thrust required of a
weapon package with either of the seekers aboard. Initial missile ve-
locities and time to intercept are higher because of the greater detection
range. Table 5-1 presents the results of this analysis. For comparative
purposes, Table 4—1 presents thrust requirements for a missile with a
seeker detection capability of only 100 miles.
As is immediately evident, the weapon package can effect terminal
guidance for shots which would normally have missed by 8.02 miles. This
represents an increase of f>Vf> in terminal guidance capability for the same
motor. The possibility or method of increasing the seeker detection
capability by 25$ is not within the scope of this paper; the effect of
such an increase in detection capability is to vastly improve terminal
guidance capabilities.
If it were possible to put limits on probable errors another inter-




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For Shots
Short of Perfect Trajectory, Satellite at 100 Miles
Unguided Miss
Distance
Initial Conditions Thrust Bequired
at InterceptPickup range *mo Time to Intercept
(miles) (miles) ft/se« (seconds) Altitude (pounds)
125 793.6 25.97
1 125 793.3 25.962 473
2 125 793.0 25.954 946
3 125 792.7 25.946 1420
4 125 792,4 25.938 1895
5 125 792,1 25.930 2370
6 125 791.8 25 , 922 2840
7 125 791.5 25.914 3310
8 125 791.2 25.906 3790
8,02 125 791.2 25,9058 3800
mean that 1450 pounds of thrust is the maximum required if the seeker has
a 100 mile detection capability. With a 125 mile detection range a motor
capability of only 946 pounds of thrust is required for the same maximum
error. A 34.7$ reduction in thrust can thus be effected if seeker detect-
ion range is increased by 25$. The remarks in the initial paragraphs of
this chapter pertaining to compounding of effects would be applicable in
this case,
C. Conclusions
Only one set of initial conditions has been used for comparative pur-
poses. Other initial conditions will yield similar information. Design
changes in the missile package „ or entire weapon system, due to an increase
in seeker range, could be based on the results of a comprehensive analysis
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which would yield the limiting conditions on which to base a design change.
It is erident that an increase in seeker detection range increases
the terminal guidance capability. Tor the simulated weapon package used
in this paper, an increase of 51$ in terminal guidance capability results




EFFECT OF SYSTEM EEBORS
A. Actual Target Fath Versus Simplified Concept
In Derivation Summaries 2-2 and 2-3, the intercept of the satellite
is to he accomplished by a constant bearing intercept. The mathematical
development of the intercept equations uses a fictitious line-of-sight
with an angular velocity which will remain zero for the remaining time
of the problem after it has been nulled. Fig. 6-1 is a diagram, which
is not to scale, for the two-dimensional intercept problem with the
satellite or target actually travelling along a curved path and the
interceptor missile travelling along a radial. It is necessary to know
whether or not there will be a miss-distance or error produced in the
actual intercept case by assuming that once the angular velocity of the
line-of-8ight has been nulled it will remain nulled.
Referred to an inertial coordinate system, the angular velocity of
the line-of-8ight between the target and the weapon package of the anti-
satellite missile may be expressed as below.
r~) - ^ x7r _ <^* vm
The above vector expression for the angular velocity of the line-of-sight
will produce the following magnitude expression for the two-dimensional
conditions shown in Fig. 6-1.
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kJ« = JC ^T SinoC " V^ ^ ,n O (1)
Therefore in order for CJ, c to become zero a value of V must be obtained
l.i jn
which is equal to \Z-j- J
n
— .
S i n <T
In this paper it is proposed that the guidance thrust will be applied
when the acquisition device acquires the target and develops an angular
velocity of the line-of-sight. The thrust will then be terminated at
such time when the angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the tar-
get and weapon package has been nulled.
In Tig. 6-1 it is assumed that the angular velocity of the line-of-
sight has been nulled with the target and weapon package in the positions
shown. Therefore for the conditions in Fig. 6-1
v sV «in a „ y »in £3 * B>
a T sin X T cos 8
o
K







8in * * 7T tan ^ C08 * ^
o
In order to determine the distance which the weapon package must
travel in the time, t, remaining to complete the intercept, the magnitude





Jig. 6-1 Geometric Features of the Actual Intercept
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The error or miss-distance which could result if the guidance thrust
is not actuated after once nulling the angular velocity of the line-of-
eight will become the difference between the actual distance, r_ - r , and
the distance actually covered in the time remaining by the weapon package.
,'. L = Miss Distance = \fr ' rnl ' C V^/ "5 9*
?
J (*>
Using equations (2) and (3), miss-distance may be expressed as below.
6 - fSl-Cosei-^^^Sme]-[VT(Sme-tta^Co%e)^-^^ J(5)
In order to obtain any information from equation (5), the small angle
assumption will be used for the angle 0. The small angle assumption may
also be used with the angle 0, but it will only ease the actual calcula-
tions and not actually bring out any vital information. Therefore the
angle 3 will be defined as below:
For a circular orbit -rrr - —
L
where \j = H 'f
,". 6= &* = S,nB
Taking equation (5) and setting the angle p equal to zero, the
following results are obtained for d. .





f-O: rT [i-d.se3- [VriimS-^3^ J (6a)
Therefore it may be seen when equations (6a) and (5) are compared,
any miss-distance which will be produced in the actual intercept problem
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will be the result of the terms which contain the angle 0.
Rewriting equation (5) and omitting the terms that add to zero, the
following results are obtained for error, d .
6 = ft t°»$ Si"& * Vr 7fTan(3 COS 9 (?)
- rr
Tar\$ ^Ljt - \JT /tTan$ COS 9
.-. t = VT /tqn $ a- cose] ( 7a )
or 6 = ^S^[A/]U^ (7b )
Examining equation (7a) it is apparent that there is a miss-distance
produced in the actual, problem, if the guidance thrust is not actuated
after the angular velocity of the line-of-sight has been nulled. However
the actual magnitude of the error is very small as is shown in the example
below.
Assume: t 10 sec,
30 « o.052^ rad.
V. ^.8^93 mile/sec
v m i+059 statute miles





Prom the above example it may be assumed that unless large values of
problem time are remaining when the angular velocity of the line-of-sight
is nulled, and unless the angle 0, generated by the angular velocity of
the line-of-sight, is large, the error produced by assuming that the angular
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velocity of the line stays nulled can be ignored.
B. Misalignment of Weapon Package Reference Axes
In this paper it has "been assumed that there is an lnertial reference
frame in the weapon package of the anti-satellite missile. The alignment
of the reference frame of the weapon package was discussed in Chapter 2,
Section B.
The seeker device of the weapon package will initially he aligned
along the axis of the onboard reference system which is normal to the
radial position vector of the anti-satellite missile and in the orbital
plane of the satellite. When the seeker device acquires the satellite,
an angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the missile weapon pack-
age and the satellite will be generated as the seeker moves away from its
initial position and commences to track the satellites.
Misalignment of the seeker reference axis within the orbital plane
of the satellite will cause the magnitude of the initial angular velocity
of the line-of-sight between the weapon package and the satellite to be
larger or smaller than the ideal case where no misalignment of the ref-
erence axis exist 8. Because in this paper the initial angular velocity
of the line-of-sight is used only to actuate the thrust mechanism the
magnitude of the initial angular velocity of the line-of-sight has no
significance. Only if the misalignment of the seeker's reference axis
is greater than the half angle of the seeker's cone of acquisition will
there be any reduction of time available to complete the intercept. Any
appreciable reduction of available intercept time will invalidate the
thrust requirements specified in Chapter **.
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Misalignment of the seeker reference axis normal to the orbital plane
and/or misalignment of the other two onboard reference axes, which are
used as a reference for guidance thrust direction, will cause the initial
thrust direction to be in error. Again this paper has stated that the
thrust direction for the terminal guidance phase will be in such a direction
as to null the angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the weapon
package and the target satellite. Therefore because the seeker device
continues to generate an angular velocity of the line-of-sight, a misaligned
initial thrust direction will be corrected in order to produce a velocity
direction for the weapon package which will null the angular velocity of
the line-of-sight.
0. Premature Thrust Termination
In section A of this chapter an investigation was conducted to deter=>
mine the miss distance which would be produced in the actual intercept
problem if, after the angular velocity of the line-of-sight between the
anti-satellite missile °s weapon package and the satellite was nulled, the
guidance thrust was not actuated again. Now using the equations developed
in section A of this chapter an investigation will be made of miss distance
resulting from termination of the guidance thrust before the angular
velocity of the line-of-sight between the weapon package and the satellite
is completely nulled and failure of the guidance thrust to be re-applied
to the weapon package. Early termination of thrust could result from a
failure in the thrust system itself or because the seeker could no longer
distinguish an angular velocity of the line-of-sight.
In order to null the angular velocity of the line-of-sight between





equal to V_ sin Q + V_ tan £ cos % (Equation 2 of section A).
For this investigation let the weapon package velocity equal 99$ of the
value required to null the angular velocity of the line-of-sight.
t\ Vm = 0,99 V ffl = 0,99 [VT sin 4 VT tan 3 cos «] (8)
null
Using equations (3) and (k) from section A for the miss distance pro-
duced and the value of V above, the following expression may be written
m
for miss distance, £ ,
£ - r
T [1
- cos Q *• tan £ sin «] - [0,99 VT (sin 9 * tan cos «)t
-§ et2 ] < 9 >
Taking equation (8) above and setting the angle £ equal to zero, the
following results are obtained for
t = rT [1
- cos «] - [0,99 VTt sin 3 - \ gt
2
] (10)
.'. 6=| gt2 - 0,99 gt2 + \ gt2 - 0,01 gt2 (11)
Rewriting equation (9) and substituting the value of <£ from equation
(11) for those terms which do not contain the angle 6 the following results
may be obtained for miss distance,




- 0,99 Vjt tan p cos $] (12)
£ = 0.01 gt2 + V
T
t tan [1 - 0,99 cos 9] (13)
For the example worked in section A t equation (13) gives a value of
31. ^ ft, for mi 88 distance A comparison of equations (7) and (13) shows
that the dominant term when the angular velocity of the line-of-sight is
not nulled is the difference between the velocity actually acquired by the
weapon package and the velocity required of the weapon package in order to
6^

null the angular velocity of the line-of-sight. By keeping the time short
"between thrust termination and intercept, miss distance produced by fail-
ure to null the angular velocity of the line-of-sight may be kept to a
negligible value.
Performance equations developed in Chapter 3 indicate that the angular
velocity of the line-of-sight decreases as the intercept nears completion.
It is also true that the seeker will have some minimum threshold value at
which detection of an angular velocity of the line-of-sight will no longer
he possible. Because of this dead zone terminal guidance thrust will he
terminated prematurely. Equation (13) shows that if the seeker threshold
is reached early in the prohlem, or if thrust is terminated prematurely
for any other reason, it is imperative that thrust he re-activated
„
D. Satellite or Missile Time Errors
In Chapter k thrust requirements are developed for the terminal
guidance phase of the satellite intercept prohlem based on errors which
produce physical displacements between the satellite and the weapon pack-
age of the anti-satellite missile. In all the calculations of Chapter k t
it was assumed that if no thrust were applied to the weapon package the
satellite would pass through the missile's position radial either above or
"below the weapon package'-' 8 position when the weapon package reached the
peak of its trajectory along the radial. For this look at thrust require-
ments it will he assumed that if the weapon package were on time a perfect
intercept would he accomplished.
For the situation in which the anti-satellite missile is early, the
thrust requirement will only he that which is needed to counter the effects
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of gravity acting on the weapon package after it has reached the peak of
the trajectory.
In the case in which the anti-satellite missile is late, the procedure
for determining the thrust requirement applies the same equations utilized
in Chapter 4 for determination of thrust requirements. The position of
the weapon package of the anti-satellite missile is determined by having
the weapon package acquire the satellite from a position along the radial
trajectory path which corresponds to the number of seconds that the weapon
package is late. Fig. 6=2 shows a plot of thrust requirement for the
weapon package versus late time of the weapon package.
Table 6-1 shows the same breakdown that is utilized in the tables
of Chapter 4 for the cases when the weapon package is 20 seconds late and
kO seconds late. For the maximum available thrust used in this paper, it
can be shown that at an altitude of 100 miles the weapon package could be
approximately 48 seconds late and still complete an intercept if there were
no error caused by physical displacement between theoretical and actual




Initial Conditions and Thrust Requirements For









(miles) (miles) °(ft/sec) (seconds) (pounds)
20 100 100 1245.00 20.60 65^.6
20 500 100 1047.00 21.55 619.
20 1000 100 873.70 22.62 590.0
40 100 100 1856.81 20.33 2672.5
4o 500 100 1551.10 21.55 2476.7
40 1000 100 1283.71 22.62 2358.2
A comparison of the thrust requirement tables in Chapter 4 and those
above in Table 6=>1 indicates that a late arrival of the weapon package by
40 seconds calls for a thrust requirement comparable to a 3 ** 4 mile
physical displacement error. It is much easier to envision a physical
displacement error of 3 4 miles between satellite and weapon package
positions than a late arrival of the weapon package of 40 seconds. There-
fore if the terminal guidance phase thrust requirements are based on
anticipated physical displacement errors, the thrust available would be
sufficient to take care of any errors resulting from satellite or weapon
package time errors. Displacement errors are therefore more dominant







As a result of the analysis and considerations of this paper certain
conclusions may "be reached;
1. The terminal guidance problem can be defined with geometrical
relationships. Solution of the equations for results which
outline feasibility limits is enhanced by assuming that
gravity acts equally on both the target and the missile.
General thrust and seeker threshold criteria for a weapon
package as visualized by this paper can then he found.
2. Physical displacement errors between missile trajectory
and satellite orbit are more critical than other possible
errors. Thrust requirements to effect intercept are higher
for this type of error.
3. Thrust requirements for terminal guidance are feasible.
Minimum thrusts are needed if target acquisition is made
at the peak of the weapon package trajectory and physically
above the satellite path.
*4-. An improvement of approximately 2$$ in seeker range cap-
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